2011 NFL Draft: Torrey Smith Will Not Be A Bust Like Darrius Heyward-Bey

Torrey Smith is the first highly touted University of Maryland wide receiver to enter the NFL draft since Darrius Heyward-Bey, who so far in his two-year NFL career has contributed nothing but negative value to the Oakland Raiders as measured by Football Outsiders' DYAR and DVOA, but NFL teams thinking of drafting Smith should not worry that having Smith on their rosters will involve a repeat performance of Heyward-Bey's struggles. This lack of concern should stem from the knowledge that Smith is a better wide receiver than Heyward-Bey due to the fact he was a more valuable wide receiver in college.

As I did in two previous articles, I measured value based on how Smith's quarterbacks fared once his statistics are removed from theirs compared to how they performed when his statistics were included in theirs.

For Smith's Maryland career, once his statistics were removed from his quarterbacks', the quarterbacks experienced a 2.6 percent decrease in completion percentage (from 57.2 percent to 55.7 percent), an 8.8 percent decrease in yards per pass attempt (from 6.8 to 6.2), a 6.7 percent decrease in yards per completion (from 11.9 to 11.1), and a 21.7 percent decrease in touchdown percentage (from 4.6 percent to 3.6 percent).

During Heyward-Bey's Maryland career, once his statistics were removed, his quarterbacks underwent a .5 percent increase in completion percentage (from 60.6 percent to 60.9 percent), an 8.3 percent decrease in yards per pass attempt (from 7.2 to 6.6), a 7.6 percent decrease in yards per completion (from 11.8 to 10.9), and a 13.5 percent decrease in touchdown percentage (from 3.7 percent to 3.2 percent).

At first glance, it might look like the two former Terrapins are not far removed from each other in terms of ability and the value they provided to the Maryland passing game. Smith has sizable advantages in completion percentage value and touchdown percentage value, but only a small one in yards per pass attempt value. Heyward-Bey, on the other hand, seems to be able to claim superiority in yards per completion value, which would indicate he is capable of making bigger plays than Smith.

However, their career statistics are misleading because of the polar opposite paths their collegiate careers took. Once that is factored in, Smith distances himself even more from Heyward-Bey.

The only reason why Smith's production does not look even more valuable is because of his freshman year when he was barely utilized, only receiving 3.2 passes per game that season. Due to the small number of times the football was thrown in his direction, once his statistics were removed, Maryland quarterbacks did not experience a change in completion percentage, and they only got 1.5 percent worse in yards per pass attempt (from 6.7 to 6.6), 1.7 percent worse in yards per completion (from 11.8 to 11.6), and 10.5 percent worse in touchdown percentage (from 3.8 percent to 3.4 percent).

When Smith was allowed a more integral role in the Maryland passing offense and given the opportunity to prove himself as a wide receiver in his sophomore and junior seasons, he was extremely valuable to his quarterbacks.

As a sophomore, once his statistics were removed from his quarterbacks', Maryland's quarterbacks underwent a 4.1 percent decrease in completion percentage (from 58.5 percent to 56.1 percent), a 15.3 percent decrease in yards per pass attempt (from 6.5 to 5.8), a 10.2 percent decrease in yards per completion (from 11.2 to 10.3), and a 22.6 percent decrease in touchdown percentage (from 3.1 percent to 2.4 percent).

During his junior season, once his statistics were removed, his quarterbacks became 4.6 percent worse in completion percentage (from 56.3 percent to 53.7 percent), 15.3 percent worse in yards per pass attempt (from 7.2 to 6.1), 10.2 percent worse in yards per completion, and 23.2 percent worse in touchdown percentage (from 6.9 percent to 5.3 percent).

Smith's sophomore and junior seasons top any season Heyward-Bey had at Maryland and are also indicative of a player who got better each season he was in college.

Contrast that to Heyward-Bey, who had his best season as a freshman and got progressively worse over his career in the value he provided to his quarterbacks' yards per pass attempt and yards per completion averages.

In his freshman year, once his statistics were removed, Heyward-Bey's quarterbacks experienced an 8.5 percent decrease in yards per pass attempt (from 7.1 to 6.5) and a 9.4 percent decrease in yards per completion (from 11.7 to 10.6).

As a sophomore, his quarterbacks underwent a 6.6 percent decrease in yards per pass attempt (from 7.6 to 7.1) and an 8.5 percent decrease in yards per completion (from 11.8 to 10.8).

During his junior season, his quarterbacks became 5.9 percent worse in yards per pass attempt (from 6.8 to 6.4) and 5.8 percent worse in yards per completion (from 12.0 to 11.3).

When the Oakland Raiders drafted Heyward-Bey, they were drafting a wide receiver who had spent his entire time in college becoming less valuable as a wide receiver. Based on his career path, it is no wonder he has failed to make his mark in the NFL.

When an NFL team drafts Smith, however, based on how he performed in his sophomore and junior seasons when he was a main figure in the Maryland passing game, the franchise should feel confident they are receiving an impact wide receiver that will provide good value to a passing attack.

Kentucky's Freshmen and Upperclassmen Share Fault When The Wildcats Lose

John Calipari's second-least inexperienced team of the last four seasons has lost eight games this year, one fewer than Calipari's teams lost over the three previous seasons, but the reason behind their defeats does not lie entirely with their freshmen class. Kentucky's freshman trio of Brandon Knight, Terrence Jones, and Doron Lamb along with the rest of the Wildcats all see a major decrease in their overall statistics in losses.

Collectively, in relation to how the freshmen perform when Kentucky loses to how they perform when Kentucky wins, the freshmen experience a 15.5 percent decrease in effective field goal percentage (from 56.0 percent to 47.3 percent), an 11.2 percent decrease in true shooting percentage (from 58.9 percent to 52.3 percent), a 17.1 percent decrease in assist percentage (from 16.4 percent to 13.6 percent), a 2.1 percent decrease in turnover percentage (from 14.0 percent to 13.7 percent), a 14.6 percent decrease in offensive rebounding percentage (from 4.8 percent to 4.1 percent), a 5.7 percent decrease in defensive rebounding percentage (from 12.9 percent to 12.2 percent), a 13.2 percent decrease in total rebounding percentage (from 9.1 percent to 7.9 percent), and a 1.9 percent decrease in points per game (from 48.0 to 47.1).

The rest of the team when Kentucky loses undergoes a 13.4 percent decrease in effective field goal percentage (from 53.6 percent to 46.4 percent), a 16.0 percent decrease in true shooting percentage (from 56.9 percent to 47.8 percent), an 8.2 percent decrease in assist percentage (from 8.5 percent to 7.8 percent), a 2.9 percent decrease in turnover percentage (from 13.6 percent to 13.2 percent), a 4.3 percent decrease in offensive rebounding percentage (from 9.4 percent to 9.0 percent), a .7 percent increase in defensive rebounding percentage (14.7 percent to 14.8 percent), a 4.1 percent decrease in total rebounding percentage (from 12.3 percent to 11.8 percent), and a 25.8 percent decrease in points per game (from 31.8 to 23.6).

Although Kentucky's freshman trio have a bigger drop-off in their shooting percentages from the field than the rest of the team, they make up for it with their superior conversion of free throws.

In losses, the rest of the team averages 3.5 fewer free throw attempts than they do in victories. The rest of the team also sees a drop in their free throw percentage from 69.4 percent in wins to 64.9 percent in losses.

On the other hand, the freshman trio might take 1.3 fewer free throw attempts when Kentucky loses, but they raise their free throw percentage from 71.9 percent in wins to 77.4 percent in losses. Due to that improvement, Kentucky's freshman trio are only making .2 fewer free throw attempts per game in losses than they make in wins.

Therefore, when it comes to total shooting, Kentucky's freshman trio do a better job of maintaining their shooting statistics.

The struggle the rest of the team has in maintaining its true shooting percentage has a lot to do with its precipitous decline in points per game. Kentucky's offense is most reliant on the freshman trio for its production, but contributions from the other players are still necessary for the Wildcats to be at their best. When Kentucky does not receive those contributions, especially when the rest of the team averages 8.2 fewer points per game in losses, the team is destined to lose the game because while the freshman are very talented, they cannot do it all by themselves.

When it comes to declines in assist percentage, it goes back to poor shooting from the field and since the freshman trio are the ones who have the bigger drop-off in effective field goal percentage, they are the most at fault in this category because it is impossible to get an assist when a teammate misses the shot.

In rebounding, the freshmen are also responsible for most of the team's drop-off, keeping the team from being as efficient as possible on the offensive and defensive sides of the ball.

Among the freshman trio themselves, each carries responsibility for Kentucky's poor showing in losses.

Brandon Knight's biggest problems are a result of his inferior shooting and assist percentage to turnover percentage ratio in defeats.

Knight gets 21.0 percent worse in effective field goal percentage (from 57.7 percent to 45.6 percent) and 17.0 percent worse in true shooting percentage (from 61.3 percent to 50.9 percent). In turn, due to his inferior shooting in losses, he sees a 10.4 percent decrease in his points per game average (from 18.2 to 16.3).

As a point guard whose value is so closely tied to his shooting numbers, the drop-off of his shooting percentages in losses is most damaging to his production, but his decreased proficiency as a distributor is almost as damaging.

When Kentucky loses, Knight undergoes a 12.8 percent decrease in assist percentage (from 23.4 percent to 20.4 percent) and a 24.2 percent increase in turnover percentage (from 16.1 percent to 20.0 percent). The decrease in assist percentage is forgivable because the whole team shoots so poorly in losses, but the increase in turnovers is unforgivable.

Terrence Jones is the one freshman who is best at maintaining his shooting statistics across wins and losses. He experiences only a 4.9 percent decrease in effective field goal percentage (from 49.0 percent to 46.6 percent) and a 2.1 percent decrease in true shooting percentage (from 52.8 percent to 51.7 percent).

However, he really comes up short with his rebounding numbers. In losses, Jones becomes 5.2 percent worse in offensive rebounding percentage (from 9.6 percent to 9.1 percent), 14.0 percent worse in defensive rebounding percentage (from 22.9 percent to 19.7 percent), and 15.5 percent worse in total rebounding percentage (from 16.8 percent to 14.2 percent).

Doron Lamb does not do much for Kentucky besides shoot and it is his shooting proficiency that leaves him drastically in Kentucky's losses. Lamb experiences a 20.2 percent decrease in his effective field goal percentage (from 63.4 percent to 50.6 percent), a 14.2 percent decrease in his true shooting percentage (from 64.6 percent to 55.4 percent), and a 6.8 percent decrease in points per game (13.2 to 12.3).

If Lamb does not shoot well, he is unable to help the Wildcats and lessens the chances of the team winning.

When the Kentucky Wildcats lose, they do so as a team as each part of the team contributes in some way to the defeat. The true bellwethers for Kentucky's chances of winning a game are how many points the non-freshmen are contributing, how well Knight and Lamb are shooting, and how well Jones is rebounding. Figure those things out and you will be able to know if Kentucky won or lost.

Andre Iguodala's Improved Play Made It Impossible For The Philadelphia 76ers To Trade Him

There was a time in the NBA season, a little more than a quarter of a way through the schedule's 82 games, where trading Andre Iguodala made sense. His subpar play even prompted me to write an article detailing why the Philadelphia 76ers should trade him. However, after he came back from his Achilles injury, his improved overall play made it impossible for the 76ers to trade him.

Before I penned the article, Iguodala was on his way to having a disappointing season and it looked like he was going to continue his decline since his best year in the 2007-08 season. A big reason why Iguodala's 2010-11 season looked like a lost cause and unhelpful to the 76ers' chances of winning was because of his poor shooting.

In his 25 games before the article, Iguodala's 47.6 effective field goal percentage and 51.7 true shooting percentage were both well below his career shooting percentages. Additionally, his 108 points produced per 100 possessions were two points produced per 100 possessions below his career offensive rating.

Had Iguodala continued to produce at that level, the 76ers would indeed have been better off without him, but he reversed his downward trend in a big way since returning from injury.

During his 20 games after he returned to the 76ers' line-up and before the February 24th trade deadline, Iguodala posted a 49.1 effective field goal percentage and 55.1 true shooting percentage. His improvement in his shooting represents a 3.2 percent increase in effective field goal percentage and a 6.6 percent increase in true shooting percentage so his biggest jump has been in his increased ability to get to the free throw line as well as convert his chances once he gets there.

For the 25 games previous to my article, Iguodala was taking one free throw for every 2.5 field goal attempts and converting just 66.4 percent of them. For his next 20 games, Iguodala shot a free throw once every 2.2 field goal attempts and made 74.5 percent of his free throw attempts.

Iguodala also improved his assist percentage dramatically, going from a 23.6 assist percentage in his first 25 games to a 28.3 assist percentage in his next 20 games. His turnover percentage also increased, from 11.8 percent to 12.4 percent, but that increase was trumped by his superior assist percentage improvement, indicating he has been a much better distributor of the ball lately.

Now, including the three games since the trade deadline, Iguodala has contributed 0.142 win shares per 48 minutes. If he is able to keep that up, it will be his best season since his 2007-08 one in that regard, and with Iguodala once again playing basketball very near the highest level he is able, it is no wonder the 76ers did not pull the trigger on a trade.

Phoenix Suns and Houston Rockets Trade Recap: The Suns Will Get More Value Out Of Aaron Brooks

When the Phoenix Suns and Houston Rockets swapped underachieving point guards Goran Dragic and Aaron Brooks, each team was hoping that the point guard they received would return to an improved shooting form of a previous season. Unfortunately for the Houston Rockets, they are unlikely to actually see Dragic improve his shooting percentages while Aaron Brooks, playing for the Phoenix Suns, is a sure bet to return to his former shooting prowess.

The reason for the prediction that Brooks is the more likely candidate to shoot better for the rest of the season is simple. His shooting performances in his 34 games with the Rockets before being traded to the Suns were very uncharacteristic of him and unlike his shooting in any other season.

In his 34 games for the Rockets, Brooks posted a 40.8 effective field goal percentage and 46.5 true shooting percentage. During his other seasons, Brooks posted a 49.3 effective field goal percentage and 53.5 true shooting percentage in 2007-08, a 47.6 effective field goal percentage and 52.1 true shooting percentage in 2008-09, and a 51.1 effective field goal percentage and 54.9 true shooting percentage.

Brooks' shooting this season for the Rockets had been so dissimilar to his others that both his effective field goal percentage and true shooting percentages were statistically significantly inferior to his shooting statistics last season and were not far off from being statistically significantly inferior to his first two seasons in the NBA.

Since Brooks has 213 games of adequate shooting and only 34 games of poor shooting, considering the sample sizes of the two data sets, the 213 games are more representative of his true shooting ability. Therefore, the Suns can expect him to improve in that department and post a true shooting percentage around 53.0 percent for them going forward.

Meanwhile, in the case of Dragic, it is not this season we should be looking at as not correctly stating his ability as a shooter. In his 48 games with the Suns this year, Dragic had a 46.5 effective field goal percentage and 49.2 true shooting percentage.

Those shooting percentages have a lot more in common with his rookie 2008-09 season where he had a 43.8 effective field goal percentage and 48.7 true shooting percentage than they do with last season's 52.7 effective field goal percentage and 56.6 true shooting percentage.

In fact, Dragic's true shooting percentage with the Suns this season is statistically significantly worse than his last season mark and his effective field goal percentage is right on the cusp of being statistically significantly worse, meaning it is last season of which we should be skeptical when judging Dragic's shooting ability.

The difference between the two data sets, 103 games of poor shooting and 80 games of great shooting, is not as stark as the difference for Brooks' data sets, but Dragic does have more of a history of being a bad shooter. It is his impressive shooting from last year that is the statistical outlier so the Rockets should not expect him to reach those kinds of shooting heights again. They should just prepare themselves to experience a continuation of his season's poor shooting under their watch.

Even if neither point guard's shooting improves with his new team, Brooks will still give the Suns more value than Dragic because he is a better ballhandler. His assist percentage to turnover percentage ratio is vastly superior to Dragic's so he does not have to rely on his shooting as much to be a good point guard.

It is a good thing for the Rockets that the Suns had to send a lottery-projected first-round draft pick along with Dragic since it is incredibly unlikely the Rockets will see the Dragic of last season.